The recent controversy, involving members of the Congress and Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) over a comment on the lifestyle of former Chief Minister K. Kamaraj, has triggered supporters of the national party to recall bitter episodes in the long and troubled history of relationship with the Dravidian major.
In 1971 the two parties had come together for the first time to face the polls when the Lok Sabha and Assembly elections were held simultaneously. At that time, there were two Congress parties – Congress (Ruling or Requisitionists) and Congress (Organisation) – in the wake of the famous split in 1969. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was the face of the Congress (R) while Jagjivan Ram was the party president. In the Congress (O), former Karnataka Chief Minister S. Nijalingappa was the chief and Kamaraj, its guiding force in Tamil Nadu.
By the time the Lok Sabha was dissolved in late December 1970, the DMK, which came to power in March 1967 after thrashing the Congress at the hustings, had become closer to the Congress (R). In 1969, the Dravidian major had supported the candidature of V.V. Giri, who had the indirect backing of the Prime Minister and her supporters, in the presidential election. Giri eventually won, defeating the Congress’ official nominee N. Sanjiva Reddy. In Parliament, the DMK supported the Union government’s measures, considered progressive in the 1960s – bank nationalisation and the abolition of privy purses (Constitutionally-guaranteed tax-free payments made to former rulers of princely States after they joined India post 1947) – as the ruling party at the Centre had been reduced to a minority in the Lok Sabha and it had to depend on smaller parties for support.
After meeting the Prime Minister in New Delhi on December 31, 1970, the then Chief Minister Karunanidhi hinted in Chennai next day that he preferred simultaneous elections to the Assembly and the Lok Sabha poll, even though he denied then that he had discussed with Indira Gandhi the issue of dissolution of the Assembly, which had one year to go. Four days later, talking to reporters after the official communique on the Assembly dissolution, the Chief Minister said frequent elections would lead to “administrative stagnation and come in the way of implementing programmes and policies already decided upon besides creating difficulties to the people.” (The Hindu, January 5, 1971). Members of the party’s Executive and the General Council were of the view that even though the present Ministry could have continued for one more year, it would be “appropriate to have both the elections simultaneously in the larger interest of the people,” the report added, quoting Karunanidhi.
On the Opposition front, shedding their 30-year-long rivalry in politics, Kamaraj and the founder of the Swatantara party, C. Rajagopalachari (Rajaji or CR), had teamed up to throw the DMK out of power. In the previous Assembly election, CR was responsible for stitching up a formidable coalition against the Congress, which had lost power in the poll. It was against this backdrop that the DMK had decided to tie up with the Congress (R) in the State, which had leaders including C. Subramaniam (CS) and R.V. Swaminathan (RVS). At that time, the Congress (R) was considered weaker than the Congress (O), which commanded the loyalty of most of the rank and file.
Even though the DMK and the Congress (R) decided to face the electorate together, they hit a roadblock over sharing of seats, both in number and the selection of constituencies. The Congress (R) had begun seeking the allotment of 20 Lok Sabha seats and 67 Assembly seats, a demand that the ruling party in the State could ill afford to concede. The DMK, which was initially willing to allot six Lok Sabha and 20 Assembly seats to the national party, had to accommodate five other parties in its coalition and the parties were the Communist Party of India (CPI), Praja Socialist Party (PSP), Tamil Arasu Kazhagam (TAK), Forward Bloc, and the Muslim League. So, it had sent its Industries Minister S. Madhavan to Delhi to meet the PM but the issue remained unresolved as he could not meet Indira Gandhi, who was busy with “her party affairs and the visit of the Canadian Prime Minister [Pierre Elliott Trudeau],” (The Hindu, January 13, 1971).
A visit by Indira Gandhi to Chennai a week later did not help matters. At the Raj Bhavan, she along with CS, held an hour-long meeting with Karunanidhi, V. R. Nedunchezhian, who was no. 2 in the Cabinet and the general secretary of the DMK, and Madhavan. The DMK supremo told journalists after the meeting that the talks were “satisfactory though progressing slowly and steadily,” whereas the Prime Minister indicated her “hands off” approach towards the issue. “People here are capable of settling these matters by themselves,” she said. (The Hindu, January 20, 1971). Interestingly, she received a memorandum from K. S. Ekambaram, secretary of the South Madras district unit of her party in which the latter had sought her permission for the State unit to fight the elections on its own if the Dravidian major did not give it a “sizable number” of seats for the Lok Sabha and State Assembly.
As no breakthrough was achieved over the talks with the DMK, the TNCC (R) Working Committee, at an emergency meeting a couple of days later, asked the party to take “serious steps” to contest the elections either alone or in alliance with other “progressive parties.” The State unit was insistent on contesting in 12 Lok Sabha seats. At the same time, the working committee was not for a complete break with the DMK.
On the night of January 24, the ruling party in the State announced its first list of candidates for 169 Assembly and 26 Lok Sabha constituencies, even as the process of filing of nomination papers had begun. On the same day, the Congress (R) came out with its list of nominees for seven Lok Sabha seats and the list included CS for Coimbatore and RVS for Sivaganga. Subramanaim had even said his party had planned to contest in 12 to 15 Lok Sabha constituencies and the denial of four constituencies – Coimbatore, Tiruchengode, Sivaganga and Chengalpattu – had led his party to release its list. Three days later, Karunanidhi announced that the talk with the Congress (R) had failed. He added that his party had offered 9 Lok Sabha seats and 15 Assembly seats to them whereas the other party stuck to its demand for 10 Lok Sabha and 20 Assembly seats.
Meanwhile, sections of the functionaries in the Congress (R) had started criticising the attitude of CS and RVS towards the issue of seat sharing. K.T. Kosalram, who had been a member of the State Assembly between 1946 and 1967 [and who was later elected from the erstwhile Tiruchendur Lok Sabha constituency thrice (1977, 1980 and 1984), decide to quit the post of general secretary of the State unit, as a mark of protest against his senior colleagues’ style of functioning. He accused the two of being “concerned only about their seats” without having the “interests of the ‘cadres” in the provision of seat, according to this newspaper on January 28.
When it looked that the Congress (R) was about to part its ways with the Dravidian major, the talks between the two parties were resumed on the night of January 29 at the initiative of the Prime Minister when a final bid to reach accord was made, The Hindu reported on January 31.In his autobiography, Nenjukku Needhi, (volume 2), Karunanidhi records that he received mid-night calls from Indira Gandhi and her adviser-cum-trouble-shooter G. Parthasarathi, who had wanted him to set apart 20 Assembly and 10 Lok Sabha seats for the party. He conveyed to them that he would not be able to share any Assembly seat but would consider allotting a few more Lok Sabha seats. On January 30 came the shocker that the Congress (R), while striking a deal with the DMK, had decided to forego its claim for the Assembly seats. However, it would contest in 10 Lok Sabha seats including Puducherry. A pact to this effect was signed by RVS and Nedunchezhian. As CS knew that there would be sections in his party which would hold him responsible for the understanding, he chose to opt himself out of the electoral race, a decision that he, in his memoirs “Hand of Destiny” (volume 3) [which was released in 2010, ten years after the death of CS], attributed to “my disagreement with Indira Gandhi’s humiliating deal with Karunanidhi on seat sharing.” However, his explanation in 1971 was that he should not get himself tied up to any particular constituency but concentrate on the election campaign and party propaganda. But, Swaminathan did not have any such compunction. So, he entered the fray in Madurai. The remaining eight seats were: Tirutanni, Cuddalore, Tindivanam, Mettur, Krishnagiri, Karur, Sivakasi and Tenkasi.
Karunanidhi, who hailed the agreement as “a great victory,” pointed out that in five out of the 10 seats allotted to the Congress, his party had originally named its candidates but as a sequel to the accord, the DMK would withdraw its nominees. CS had acknowledged that there might be “understanding” among the party workers at the outcome but he expressed the hope that they would “appreciate that the decision was taken on the advice and with the concurrence of the Congress (R) high command,” this newspaper stated.
As anticipated by him, noisy scenes were witnessed in the office of the State unit of the Congress (R) when Subramaniam and Swaminathan arrived. Some members shouted “Shame, shame” and “Down, down with CS and RVS.” The press conference of Subramaniam was interrupted by certain party members, who demanded that he explain why he accepted the DMK’s offer. A few days later, D. Sanjivayya, Union Minister of Industry, came to Chennai as the emissary of the Congress (R) president, to explore the possibility of securing a “reasonable number” of Assembly seats for his party but his mission ended in failure as he could not meet Karunanidhi. N V. Natarajan. Labour Minister called on the visiting leader and told him that Karunanidhi felt “embarrassed”- to meet him and say “no.” The DMK’s position was that seat adjustments would have been possible at the initial stages but it was “too late now to do anything,” The Hindu wrote on February 4. Around the same time, Swaminathan told a press conference that he had signed the agreement with the DMK “at the instance of the party high command.”
On February 14, during her visit to Hyderabad, Indira Gandhi, in an interaction with journalists, described as “unfortunate” the agreement of her party with the D.M.K. in Tamil Nadu and said “telephone lines were down and all things happened simultaneously.” Next day, in Tiruchi, Karunanidhi agreed with the Prime Minister’s statement that “telephone lines were down.”
All the controversy was forgotten when the people of the State exercised their franchise in March 1971. The DMK-led front bagged all but one Lok Sabha seat (Nagercoil), which was won by Kamaraj. With regard to the Assembly poll, the coalition had inflicted a crushing defeat on the alliance stitched by Kamaraj and CR, as the Dravidian major itself bagged 184 seats, a record that remains unparalleled for any party. Besides, the ruling party’s allies won 21 seats.
As the Congress (R) got an overwhelming majority at the all India level, Indira Gandhi took CS into her Cabinet again in April and Subramaniam, after a gap of four years, re-entered the Lok Sabha on his election from Krishnagiri in a by-election. RVS had to wait for nine more years to become a Union Minister. He served as Union Minister of State for Agriculture during 1980-83 when Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister.
