Nepal’s Gen Z protests: Democracy’s unravelling or democratic renewal?

The flames that consumed Kathmandu’s government buildings on September 9 illuminated more than just the immediate crisis in Nepal. As protesters set fire to Parliament, ministerial residences, and media offices despite Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli’s resignation, the violence revealed the deep structural failures of Nepal’s democratic experiment and has raised troubling questions about the country’s political future.

Systemic revolt

What began as protests against the Oli government’s social media ban snowballed into a broader indictment of Nepal’s political establishment. The initial trigger — restrictions on digital platforms — resonated particularly with young Nepalis who had grown increasingly frustrated with rampant corruption, nepotism and the lavish lifestyles of political elites’ children while the country remained mired in underdevelopment and political dysfunction.

The government’s brutal response proved catastrophic. Security forces killed at least 19 young protesters on September 8, transforming what might have remained localised dissent into nationwide outrage. The deaths seem to have galvanised a generation that had watched political leaders cycle through power while fundamental problems — youth unemployment, economic stagnation leading to severe out-migration and institutional decay — remained unaddressed.

The second day of protests marked a dangerous escalation. Even as Mr. Oli resigned and Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak stepped down “on moral grounds”, demonstrators continued their destructive rampage. They torched the homes of leaders across party lines, attacked former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and his wife, former Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba of the Nepali Congress, ransacked government buildings and targeted media institutions such as the offices of the Kantipur group. Police withdrew from protecting official buildings, leaving protesters to operate with impunity across the Kathmandu Valley.

This indiscriminate violence distinguishes the current unrest from Nepal’s previous democratic movements. Unlike the Jana Andolans of 1990 and 2006, which had clear political objectives and organised leadership and a coming together of civil society groups and political organisations, the Gen Z protests exhibit what can only be described as nihilistic rage against all institutions of the state.

Dangerous precedents

The current crisis must be understood within the broader context of Nepal’s troubled democratic transition. Despite two successful people’s movements, a comprehensive constitution-writing process and the establishment of federal republican institutions, the country has failed to deliver meaningful change to ordinary citizens. Even after overthrowing monarchy, a coterie of leaders and parties have continued to rotate power, prioritising patronage networks and a carousel of self-seeking alliances over governance and principles.

This institutional failure has created space for anti-system forces. Over the past year, Nepal has witnessed sporadic pro-monarchy demonstrations, suggesting nostalgia for the pre-2006 order among some segments of society. The Hindu nationalist agenda has also gained traction, challenging the secular foundations of the 2015 Constitution (that were themselves diluted from the earlier drafts in the first Constituent Assembly).

The amorphous nature of the Gen Z movement makes it particularly susceptible to capture by such forces. While protesters have not demanded monarchy’s return, the absence of clear democratic alternatives creates dangerous possibilities.

Regional parallels

Nepal’s crisis unfolds against the backdrop of similar upheavals across South Asia. In Bangladesh, student-led protests successfully toppled Sheikh Hasina’s government but descended into cycles of violence and institutional breakdown that have delayed democratic consolidation. Sri Lanka’s Aragalaya movement, while more focused on the overthrow of the Rajapaksas, ultimately paved the way for the previously marginalised JVP to capture power.

Which trajectory Nepal follows may well depend on how emerging political alternatives respond to this moment. Current protesters’ apparent support for figures like jailed former Minister Rabi Lamichhane and Kathmandu Mayor Balendra Shah highlights the appeal of political outsiders. Both are media personalities with limited governance experience — Mr. Lamichhane through his populist RSP party, Mr. Shah through his independent mayoralty.

While Mr. Shah has called for calm and urged protesters to stop violent attacks, his simultaneous demand for Parliament’s dissolution echoes the dangerous anti-institutional rhetoric that has characterised post-uprising transitions elsewhere.

The role of Nepal’s Army remains crucial and uncertain. Army Chief Ashok Raj Sigdel has called for restraint and dialogue, but the military’s response to prolonged instability could determine whether Nepal moves toward democratic renewal or authoritarian regression.

The Gen Z protests have successfully exposed the bankruptcy of the country’s political establishment and forced recognition of systemic problems that formal democratic processes had failed to address. However, the movement’s turn toward indiscriminate violence and institutional destruction threatens to undermine legitimate democratic alternatives.

The challenge now is whether Nepal’s political forces can channel this popular energy toward constructive reform rather than allowing it to further destabilise an already fragile system. The path from legitimate protest to democratic renewal requires more than righteous anger. It demands the patient work of building alternative institutions, developing coherent policy programmes, and creating space for constructive political competition. The current trajectory toward institutional destruction, regardless of its emotional energy, offers no sustainable solutions to Nepal’s fundamental challenges.